Jag tog precis ett lån med negativ ränta. Endast tillgänglig på @llamalend. Skapad av @CurveFinance

Utöver det uppenbara från igår är detta det mest upprörande för mig. Vi avledde Megas första ekonomiska uppvisning. Även om jag fumlar till 50 % av pre-deposit cap är Mega den femte mest intäktsgenererande kedjan och DET ÄR INTE ENS LIVE. Att enbart sälja blockutrymme räcker inte i en värld som drar mot traditionella värderingsmodeller. För att tokens ska vara värdefulla måste deras underliggande kedjor generera intäkter. I det är appar och tjänster obesegrade. USDm från dag 0 innebär att vi fyller det mycket uppenbara läckage som finns på alla kedjor (till motsvarande miljoner per dag) och kan leda tillbaka det inom ekosystemet. Denna numerära skillnad kommer att vara enorm om vi lyckas bygga en blomstrande appmiljö.

Emissions farming in its current form has never sat well with me. Yes, using a speculative market for a token as a source of financing makes a lot of sense — your capital structure gets weighted towards speculators to whom you owe little, if any, legal or financial obligations. But then most charts end up looking the same, even for tokens that have some marginal — or promise of material future — rights or benefits. That is to say, they overwhelmingly went down and to the right, with a few dead cat bounces, as emissions continued. I think this is partly because issuers are not very sophisticated in how they design these emissions programs. The main innovation has been to use points, which in practice work as a kind of soft rug, with wide profit-loss corridors that whales grew tired of quickly. Before offering a suggestion, let’s recap the classic emissions playbook. Users deposit/trade/do the thing, and in exchange are offered a fixed amount of TOKEN every so often, which is typically in addition to whatever organic yield the protocol generates. This creates a kind of asymmetric bet on TOKEN, which is pretty good at the beginning point. Everyone wants the price to go up, farmers have limited downside on yield and (barring bad protocol design) protected downside on the stablecoin deposit/LP position. The tension arises when we stop our analysis here. The farmer collects their periodic TOKEN emissions, sells for cash or stablecoins. TOKEN price has constant sell pressure, which lowers the real yield to the farmer over time since they’re usually getting subsidies denominated in TOKEN rather than dollars. To understand why this is, consider updating your analysis as you progress along this timeline. 1) At the beginning, the subsidized user — who are often risk-aware managers similar to @Santiza4thePeople or @Octoshi or @dialectic_group — is relatively insulated from TOKEN price moves. They collect more if TOKEN goes up, similar to someone holding spot, but there’s not a realized downside if price dumps because they’re just earning on stablecoins. 2) Then the user collects their first round of TOKEN subsidies. Now the risk-reward has changed. You no longer have the same band of possible profits. Your upside is pretty similar — sky is the limit, in theory. But now you’re holding TOKEN so you have downside. This requires hedging, selling, or accepting the risk. This is a good time to remember that if someone wanted the risk profile of holding spot, they’d just buy TOKEN. A user that is providing stablecoin deposits or liquidity probably has a different risk tolerance than someone holding a bag of TOKEN. Specifically, a stablecoin deposit or liquidity provision can be reasonably considered an investment, rather than a speculative venture. Holding spot on TOKEN, however, is quite speculative. You are creating an awkward situation when a risk-limited user must be put in the position of maximum risk. So the logical, and easiest, thing to do is immediately hit the bid and sell your TOKEN to protect against downside — you still have upside exposure through the next epoch of the farming rewards program. Repeat this across enough users and timeline and you get the familiar, stereotypical post-TGE chart. How could this have been structured better? I would suggest that instead of offering a rate of n TOKEN every so often, in our hypothetical case above, it would have been better to offer n TOKEN only when the price hits some threshold.